James Kirkland Batson, a Black man, was tried in Kentucky state court for burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike all four Black persons from the venire, resulting in an all-white jury. Batson objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s strikes violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. He was convicted, and the Kentucky courts affirmed under the then-controlling rule of Swain v. Alabama.
Does the Equal Protection Clause allow a criminal defendant to establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination based solely on the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s own trial?
Yes. A defendant may make a prima facie Equal Protection showing from the facts of his own case by demonstrating that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove members of the defendant’s race under circumstances raising an inference of discriminatory purpose. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for the strikes.
The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that Black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case. It rejected the stricter evidentiary burden imposed by Swain v. Alabama for proving discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
The Court reasoned that racial discrimination in jury selection harms the defendant, the excluded jurors, and public confidence in the fairness of the justice system. Requiring proof of a pattern of discrimination across many cases, as Swain effectively did, made Equal Protection claims nearly impossible to prove and failed to vindicate constitutional guarantees. Because prosecutors’ peremptory challenges can be exercised in a way that reveals discriminatory intent from the circumstances of a single trial, a burden-shifting framework was appropriate. The Court remanded for further proceedings under that new standard.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, warning that the decision unduly restricted the traditional function of peremptory challenges and would burden trial courts with inquiries into prosecutors’ motives.
Batson transformed jury-selection law by making it substantially easier to challenge race-based peremptory strikes in individual cases. It narrowed Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), and became the foundation for later extensions, including Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016), and Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) |
Abstain |
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) |
Abstain |
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) |
Abstain |
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) |
Abstain |
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) |
Abstain |
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) |
Abstain |
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) |
Abstain |
Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016) |
Abstain |
Enter a case name or citation — get a structured brief where every case it cites is checked against real law.
Try Law Student Workbench →