Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, produced and sought to distribute "Hillary: The Movie," a film critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton during the 2008 presidential primary season. It planned to make the film available through video-on-demand and to advertise it on television. The Federal Election Commission concluded that the film and ads were subject to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which barred corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for electioneering communications within specified periods before elections. Citizens United challenged those restrictions as violating the First Amendment.
Does the First Amendment permit Congress to prohibit corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for political speech, including electioneering communications close to an election?
The First Amendment prohibits the government from suppressing political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. Independent expenditures, including those made by corporations and unions, do not give rise to quid pro quo corruption or its appearance sufficient to justify a ban, though disclosure and disclaimer requirements may be constitutionally applied.
No. The Court held that BCRA's restrictions on independent corporate expenditures and electioneering communications were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court upheld BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements as applied to Citizens United's film advertisements.
The Court reasoned that political speech is indispensable to democracy and does not lose First Amendment protection because its source is a corporation. It rejected Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and the portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), that sustained BCRA's ban on corporate independent expenditures, concluding that the anti-distortion rationale was inconsistent with the First Amendment. The majority further held that independent expenditures are, by definition, not coordinated with candidates and therefore do not pose the kind of quid pro quo corruption that can justify suppression of speech. At the same time, the Court found disclosure and disclaimer rules substantially related to informing the electorate and permissible absent a strong showing of burdens such as threats or harassment.
Yes. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, argued that corporations are not members of the political community in the same sense as natural persons and that Congress could constitutionally limit corporate election spending to protect democratic self-government and prevent corruption and its appearance. The dissent criticized the majority for overruling precedent unnecessarily and for deciding a broader constitutional question than the case required.
Citizens United is a landmark campaign-finance and First Amendment decision that sharply limited the government's ability to restrict independent political spending by corporations and unions. It overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and part of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), while building on the anti-corruption framework of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The decision helped pave the way for expanded independent-expenditure activity, including super PACs, as recognized in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) |
Abstain |
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) |
Abstain |
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) |
Abstain |
SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) |
Abstain |
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) |
Abstain |
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) |
Abstain |
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