Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder after stabbing Kenneth Lee. At trial, the prosecution could not call Crawford’s wife, Sylvia, because of Washington’s marital privilege, but it introduced her recorded statement to police describing the incident. Sylvia’s statement suggested the stabbing was not clearly in self-defense and contradicted parts of Michael Crawford’s account. Crawford argued that admitting the statement violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because he had no opportunity to cross-examine her.
Does the Sixth Amendment permit admission of a witness’s out-of-court testimonial statement against a criminal defendant when the witness does not testify at trial and the defendant had no prior opportunity for cross-examination?
The Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Reliability alone is not a sufficient substitute for confrontation.
No. The Court held that admitting Sylvia Crawford’s recorded police statement violated the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and Michael Crawford had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her.
The Court rejected the framework of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which had allowed hearsay based on judicial findings of reliability. Looking to the text and history of the Confrontation Clause, the Court concluded that the Framers were principally concerned with testimonial statements, especially ex parte examinations used as evidence against the accused. Because Sylvia Crawford’s statement was taken during police interrogation, it was testimonial. Since she did not testify and Crawford never had a chance to cross-examine her, the statement was inadmissible regardless of any perceived reliability.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the judgment but criticized the Court’s broad historical approach and its failure to define "testimonial" with precision. They argued the Court unnecessarily abandoned Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and created uncertainty for lower courts.
Crawford transformed Confrontation Clause doctrine by replacing the reliability-based approach of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), with a categorical rule focused on testimonial statements and cross-examination. It sharply limited prosecutors’ ability to use police statements and similar testimonial hearsay when the accused had no prior chance to confront the declarant. The case became the foundation for later decisions defining "testimonial" and applying the rule, including Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), and Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) |
Verified |
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) |
Verified |
Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) |
Verified |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) |
Verified |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) |
Abstain |
Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015) |
Abstain |
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) |
Verified |
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