Parents of two children born with serious birth defects sued Merrell Dow, alleging that the drug Bendectin caused the defects when taken during pregnancy. Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment with epidemiological studies showing no causal link between Bendectin and human birth defects. Plaintiffs offered eight experts relying on animal studies, chemical-structure analyses, and reanalysis of published epidemiological data. The district court and Ninth Circuit excluded the plaintiffs’ evidence under the Frye “general acceptance” test and granted summary judgment for the defendant.
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supersede Frye’s “general acceptance” test and require federal judges to admit expert scientific testimony based on relevance and reliability rather than general acceptance alone?
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert scientific testimony in federal court and displaced Frye’s rigid “general acceptance” test. Trial judges must act as gatekeepers to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable; reliability may be assessed by factors such as testability, peer review and publication, known or potential error rate, and general acceptance.
Yes. The Court held that Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially Rule 702, and that federal judges must screen scientific expert evidence for relevance and reliability rather than apply general acceptance as an absolute prerequisite.
The Court reasoned that Rule 702 contains no “general acceptance” requirement and that such a rigid standard conflicts with the Federal Rules’ liberal approach to admissibility. At the same time, Rule 702’s reference to “scientific knowledge” and assistance to the trier of fact imposes a reliability and fit requirement. The judge therefore must ensure that the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and properly applicable to the facts at issue. General acceptance remains relevant, but it is only one factor among others, not the sole test.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Frye was not the governing standard but criticized the Court’s multi-factor discussion as unclear and questioned whether judges could meaningfully apply the new scientific reliability framework.
Daubert is the foundational modern case on expert evidence in federal courts. It created the trial judge’s “gatekeeping” role for scientific testimony and replaced Frye with a flexible Rule 702 reliability inquiry. It was later extended to technical and other specialized expertise in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and clarified in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), which applied abuse-of-discretion review to admissibility decisions. Daubert, together with Joiner and Kumho Tire, forms the core “Daubert trilogy.”
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) |
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General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) |
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