Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church and were fired from their jobs as drug rehabilitation counselors after ingesting peyote as part of a sacramental ceremony. They applied for unemployment compensation in Oregon, but the state denied benefits because they had been discharged for work-related misconduct. Oregon law criminalized possession of peyote, though the use here was religiously motivated. The Oregon courts ultimately concluded that denying benefits burdened the claimants' free exercise of religion.
Does the Free Exercise Clause require a state to grant a religious exemption from a neutral, generally applicable criminal law banning peyote use, thereby preventing denial of unemployment benefits based on conduct violating that law?
The Free Exercise Clause does not require religious exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practice. Strict scrutiny applies in free exercise cases only in limited contexts, such as where another constitutional protection is joined with free exercise or where the government has a system of individualized exemptions.
No. A state may enforce a neutral, generally applicable prohibition on peyote use against religious adherents and may deny unemployment benefits when the discharge stemmed from conduct prohibited by that law.
Justice Scalia distinguished prior unemployment-compensation cases such as Sherbert v. Verner by explaining that those cases involved individualized governmental assessments, not across-the-board criminal prohibitions. The Court reasoned that making each citizen's religious beliefs a basis for exemption from civic obligations would permit each person to become a law unto himself. Because Oregon's drug law was neutral and generally applicable rather than targeted at religion, the incidental burden on religious practice did not trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but rejected the majority's rule, arguing strict scrutiny should still govern and that Oregon had a compelling interest in banning peyote. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented, arguing Oregon had not shown a compelling interest sufficient to justify burdening sacramental peyote use.
Smith sharply narrowed Free Exercise Clause protection by rejecting a general constitutional right to religious exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws. The decision prompted Congress to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 in an effort to restore the compelling-interest test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Later cases reacting to or refining Smith include Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which invalidated laws targeting religion, and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which limited RFRA's application to the states.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) |
Abstain |
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) |
Abstain |
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) |
Abstain |
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) |
Abstain |
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