Jagdish Rai Chadha was a Kenyan citizen of Indian descent who had overstayed his student visa in the United States and was found deportable. Under § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General suspended Chadha’s deportation based on hardship. The House of Representatives then passed a resolution vetoing that suspension pursuant to a one-House legislative veto provision. Chadha challenged the House’s action, arguing that the one-House veto was unconstitutional.
Does a statute authorizing one House of Congress to invalidate the Attorney General’s suspension of a deportation order violate the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment?
When Congress takes action having the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the Legislative Branch, it must comply with the Constitution’s requirements of passage by both Houses and presentment to the President. A one-House legislative veto is unconstitutional unless it falls within a constitutionally authorized exception.
Yes. The one-House legislative veto in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act violated the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment, and was therefore unconstitutional.
The Court reasoned that the House resolution was legislative in character because it had the purpose and effect of changing Chadha’s legal status by overturning the Attorney General’s suspension of deportation. Because the action was legislative, Article I required approval by both Houses and presentment to the President. The Court rejected arguments based on convenience, efficiency, and long governmental practice, emphasizing that the Constitution’s structural requirements cannot be avoided for practical reasons. It also found the veto provision severable from the remainder of the statute, allowing the Attorney General’s suspension authority to remain in effect.
Justice White dissented, arguing that the legislative veto was a practical and historically important device that allowed Congress to delegate broad authority to the Executive while retaining needed control. He contended the Court’s formal approach threatened the constitutionality of many federal statutes employing similar veto mechanisms. Justice Rehnquist also dissented in part on severability, concluding that the invalid veto provision should not be severed from the suspension authority.
Chadha is a leading separation-of-powers decision that invalidated the legislative veto and reinforced the Constitution’s formal requirements of bicameralism and presentment. The case curtailed Congress’s ability to control delegated executive action through one-House, two-House, or committee veto devices and pushed Congress toward other oversight tools. It is closely related to Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), on congressional control over execution of the laws, and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), which likewise enforced Article I’s prescribed lawmaking process.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) |
Abstain |
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) |
Abstain |
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