The Jacques owned rural land in Wisconsin and repeatedly refused Steenberg Homes permission to move a mobile home across their snow-covered field. Despite these refusals, Steenberg Homes intentionally directed its employees to haul the home across the Jacques' land because it was the easiest route. The crossing caused only nominal actual damage, and the jury awarded the Jacques $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The trial court set aside the punitive damages because there were no compensatory damages beyond the nominal award, and the court of appeals affirmed.
May punitive damages be awarded for an intentional trespass to land when the plaintiff proves only nominal damages and no substantial compensatory damages?
Punitive damages may be awarded in Wisconsin for intentional trespass to land even when the plaintiff receives only nominal damages. Because the right to exclude is a central property right, intentional violation of that right can justify punishment and deterrence without proof of substantial actual harm.
Yes. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that punitive damages may accompany an award of nominal damages for intentional trespass to land and reinstated the punitive damages award.
The court emphasized that the right to exclude others is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of property rights, and intentional trespass directly invades that interest. If punitive damages were unavailable absent substantial actual damage, landowners would often be left without an effective remedy because many intentional trespasses cause little measurable physical harm. The court concluded that punishment and deterrence are especially appropriate where a trespasser knowingly ignores the owner's express refusal and treats damages as a mere cost of doing business. Protecting private ownership and discouraging self-help justified allowing punitive damages based on nominal damages alone.
Jacque is a leading modern property case on the right to exclude and on punitive damages for intentional trespass. It underscores that property law protects dignitary and autonomy interests in ownership, not just measurable economic loss. The case is often read alongside State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971), which recognizes limits on the right to exclude when countervailing rights and public policy are present, and with Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 71 P.3d 296 (2003), which addresses trespass principles in contexts lacking traditional physical invasion.
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