Great Minneapolis Surplus Store ran newspaper ads offering specific fur items for sale at $1 on a "first come, first served" basis, including a black Lapin stole advertised as worth $139.50. Lefkowitz appeared first at the designated time and place, tendered $1, and demanded the advertised items. The store refused to sell, asserting a "house rule" that the offers were for women only, though that limitation was not stated in the advertisements. The trial court awarded Lefkowitz damages for the stole’s value minus the $1 price, and the store appealed.
Whether a newspaper advertisement stating a specific item, price, and "first come, first served" terms can constitute an offer that is accepted when the first customer appears ready to pay, so that the seller cannot then impose an unstated house rule.
An advertisement is ordinarily an invitation for offers, but when it is clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it may constitute an offer. Once such an offer is accepted according to its terms, the offeror may not impose new conditions not contained in the published offer.
Yes. The advertisement for the black Lapin stole was a definite offer, and Lefkowitz accepted it by being first to appear and tendering the stated price. The store breached the contract by refusing to sell on the basis of an unstated house rule.
The court emphasized that the ad identified the item, the quantity, the price, and the mode of acceptance—"first come, first served"—so nothing material was left open for negotiation. Because Lefkowitz performed exactly what the ad requested, his conduct constituted acceptance and formed a binding contract. The store’s women-only house rule was ineffective because it was not part of the published offer and could not be added after acceptance. The court also limited damages to the stole because the value of the fur coats was too speculative on the record.
Lefkowitz is a foundational contracts case for the principle that advertisements can be enforceable offers when sufficiently definite, especially where the terms specify quantity, price, and manner of acceptance. It is regularly taught to distinguish ordinary invitations to negotiate from true offers and to show that sellers cannot add post-acceptance conditions. The opinion discusses and contrasts authorities such as Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Johnson, 209 Mass. 89, 95 N.E. 290; Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75; Payne v. Lautz Bros. & Co., 166 N.Y.S. 844; and Mooney v. Daily News Co., 116 Minn. 212, 133 N.W. 573.
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