The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act authorizes federal regulation of domestic fisheries and permits the National Marine Fisheries Service to require certain vessels to carry observers. Under a rule for the Atlantic herring fishery, the agency required industry-funded at-sea monitors on some vessels, effectively making fishermen pay the monitors’ salaries. Loper Bright Enterprises and other fishing companies challenged the rule, arguing that the statute did not authorize the agency to impose those costs on regulated parties. The lower courts upheld the rule by applying Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.
Must courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute under Chevron, or must courts exercise independent judgment in deciding whether the agency acted within its statutory authority?
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts must exercise independent judgment in interpreting statutes and deciding whether an agency has acted within its lawful authority. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is overruled to the extent it required judicial deference to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
The Court held that Chevron deference is inconsistent with the APA’s command that courts decide questions of law. Courts may consider agency interpretations for their persuasive value, but they may not defer simply because a statute is ambiguous.
The Court reasoned that Article III and the APA assign courts—not agencies—the duty to say what the law is and to resolve legal questions using independent judgment. It concluded that Chevron improperly required courts to cede that responsibility whenever a statute was ambiguous, even though statutory ambiguity does not itself constitute a delegation of interpretive authority. The Court also found stare decisis did not justify retaining Chevron because the doctrine had proved unworkable and had generated instability and confusion. Prior decisions relying on Chevron were not automatically undone, but future cases must be decided without mandatory Chevron deference.
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented, arguing that Chevron properly reflected congressional choice to leave policy-laden ambiguities to expert agencies and that overruling it would unsettle administrative law and shift power from politically accountable agencies to courts.
Loper Bright is a foundational administrative law decision because it formally ends the Chevron deference regime and restores de novo judicial review of statutory meaning, while still allowing respect for agency views under Skidmore-style persuasiveness. It reshapes judicial review across the regulatory state and will affect challenges to federal agency rules in many fields. Closely related cases include Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022); and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 603 U.S. 378 (2024).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) |
Abstain |
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) |
Abstain |
Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019) |
Abstain |
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) |
Abstain |
Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 603 U.S. 378 (2024) |
Abstain |
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) |
Abstain |
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