The Endangered Species Act required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure their actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species. In 1986, the Secretary adopted a regulation limiting that consultation requirement to actions taken in the United States or on the high seas, rather than abroad. Defenders of Wildlife challenged the rule, relying on affidavits from members who had previously observed endangered species in Sri Lanka and Egypt and who stated they hoped to do so again. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring broader consultation for federally funded overseas projects.
Did the plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the regulation limiting the Endangered Species Act’s consultation requirement to domestic and high-seas actions?
Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and redressability by a favorable decision. A plaintiff cannot establish standing based on a generalized interest in proper enforcement of the law or on some day intentions lacking concrete plans.
No. The plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they failed to show a concrete and imminent injury in fact, and they also failed to establish redressability for the overseas projects at issue.
Justice Scalia explained that the affidavits describing past visits to observe species and vague intentions to return were insufficient to show imminent injury; "some day" plans without specific arrangements do not satisfy Article III. The Court also found causation and redressability lacking because the challenged federal funding was only one part of projects involving foreign governments and other entities, so a court order against the Secretary would not necessarily protect the species. In addition, Congress could not convert a generalized interest in executive compliance with law into an Article III case or controversy merely by creating a citizen-suit provision. The Court rejected the argument that a procedural right alone eliminated the need to show concrete injury from the alleged procedural violation.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O’Connor in part, argued that the plaintiffs had shown sufficient injury through their professional and personal interests in observing the endangered species and that the majority applied standing doctrine too restrictively, especially in the context of environmental and procedural-rights claims.
Lujan is a leading modern standing case and sharply limits access to federal courts by insisting on concrete injury, causation, and redressability even where Congress authorizes citizen suits. It is especially important in environmental law and procedural-rights litigation because it rejects standing based on abstract interest in lawful administration and treats vague future intentions as inadequate. Closely related cases include Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) |
Abstain |
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) |
Abstain |
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) |
Abstain |
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) |
Abstain |
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