In the final days of the Adams administration, William Marbury was appointed a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. His commission was signed by President John Adams and sealed by the Secretary of State, but it was not delivered before Thomas Jefferson took office. Jefferson ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the remaining commissions. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering Madison to deliver his commission.
Can the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus in its original jurisdiction to compel the Secretary of State to deliver Marbury’s commission?
A signed and sealed commission completes an appointment and gives the appointee a vested legal right. When a legal right is violated, the law generally provides a remedy, including mandamus for a ministerial duty. But the Supreme Court cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond the limits fixed by Article III, and a statute conflicting with the Constitution is void.
Marbury had a vested right to his commission, and withholding it violated that right; mandamus would ordinarily be an appropriate remedy because delivery was a ministerial act. However, the Court lacked constitutional authority to issue the writ in this case because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, insofar as it purported to enlarge the Court’s original jurisdiction, was unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the appointment was complete once the President signed the commission and the seal was affixed; delivery was not necessary to vest the office. Because Madison’s duty to deliver the commission was ministerial rather than discretionary, the law could provide judicial relief. The crucial problem was jurisdiction: Article III exhaustively defines the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, and Congress cannot add to it by ordinary legislation. Therefore, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was void to the extent it authorized original mandamus, establishing the judiciary’s power to disregard unconstitutional statutes.
Marbury is the foundational case for judicial review in federal constitutional law, establishing that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is and to refuse effect to statutes contrary to the Constitution. It also distinguished between politically discretionary executive acts and ministerial duties subject to judicial compulsion. Closely related cases include Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), which reinforced Supreme Court authority to review legal questions, and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which reaffirmed the binding force of the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) |
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Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) |
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