Morissette, a scrap metal collector, entered an Air Force bombing range and took spent bomb casings that had long lain scattered there. He believed the casings had been abandoned and sold them for scrap. He was prosecuted under a federal statute making it a crime to knowingly convert government property. At trial, the judge refused to let the jury consider Morissette's claim that he lacked criminal intent, and the jury convicted him.
When a federal statute criminalizes "knowingly convert[ing]" government property but does not expressly mention intent, must the government still prove a criminal intent or guilty mind?
Mere silence in a criminal statute on the element of intent does not ordinarily eliminate the traditional requirement of mens rea. For crimes derived from common-law offenses such as larceny or conversion, courts presume Congress intended to require a guilty mind unless it clearly indicates otherwise.
Yes. The Court held that criminal intent was an essential element of the offense and that the trial court erred by withholding that issue from the jury. Morissette's conviction was reversed.
Justice Jackson explained that theft-related crimes have historically required proof of a culpable mental state, and Congress is presumed to legislate against that common-law background. The phrase "knowingly converts" incorporated the traditional notion that the defendant must intentionally take property he knows is not his to take. The Court distinguished so-called public welfare offenses, where strict liability may be permitted for regulatory crimes, from traditional crimes carrying moral condemnation and substantial penalties. Because Morissette's belief that the property was abandoned bore directly on intent, the jury had to decide that question.
Morissette is a foundational modern statement of the presumption of mens rea in federal criminal law. It sharply distinguishes traditional common-law crimes from strict-liability public welfare offenses and is regularly cited when courts decide whether to read a mental-state requirement into a statute. Closely related cases include United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), and Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015).
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) |
Abstain |
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) |
Abstain |
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) |
Abstain |
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) |
Abstain |
Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) |
Abstain |
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