Decina knew he was subject to epileptic seizures and had previously suffered attacks that caused unconsciousness and loss of muscular control. Despite that knowledge, he chose to drive a car on a public street. While driving, he suffered a seizure, lost control of the vehicle, mounted the sidewalk, and struck several children, killing four and injuring another. He was prosecuted for criminally negligent homicide based on his decision to drive despite awareness of the risk.
Can a defendant be held criminally liable for homicide when the immediate fatal act occurred during an involuntary epileptic seizure, if he knowingly undertook to drive despite awareness that such a seizure might occur?
A voluntary act sufficient for criminal liability may be found in the defendant’s earlier conscious conduct when he knowingly places himself in a situation creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk of deadly harm. Unconsciousness at the precise moment of impact does not bar liability if the culpable act was the prior decision to drive with knowledge of the condition and danger.
Yes. The court held that the evidence permitted the jury to find that Decina’s voluntary decision to drive, despite knowing he was subject to epileptic seizures, constituted the culpable conduct supporting homicide liability.
The court treated the relevant voluntary act as Decina’s choice to operate the automobile while aware of his recurring seizures and their incapacitating effects. Because death resulted from the risk he consciously created by driving, the jury could find criminal negligence even though he was unconscious when the car actually struck the victims. The case therefore did not punish a purely involuntary act; it punished the earlier voluntary creation of a grave danger to others on the highway.
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People v. Decina is a leading voluntary-act case in criminal law, especially on how actus reus and mens rea operate when the final physical movement is involuntary. It is commonly cited for the principle that a defendant may be liable where the blameworthy act is the earlier conscious risk creation rather than the later unconscious bodily movement. The case is often discussed alongside Martin v. State, 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 (1944), on the requirement of a voluntary act, and Model Penal Code § 2.01, which distinguishes involuntary movements from voluntary conduct.
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