Employees of Swift & Co. worked as fire hall men who were required to remain on the employer's premises during designated on-call periods to respond to alarms and perform firefighting and related duties. They sought overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act for time spent waiting while on call. The employer argued that this waiting time was not compensable work because the employees were not continuously engaged in active labor. The litigation also involved the relevance of an interpretive bulletin issued by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division concerning compensable waiting time.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, is time spent waiting on the employer's premises while on call compensable working time, and what weight should courts give the Administrator's interpretive rulings on that question?
Whether waiting time is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act depends on the particular facts and whether the employee is engaged to wait or waiting to be engaged. Interpretive rulings, while not controlling upon courts because they are not the product of formal rulemaking, are entitled to respect according to their power to persuade based on factors such as thoroughness, validity of reasoning, consistency, and practical judgment.
The Court held that compensability of waiting time is a fact-specific question that cannot be resolved by a single legal formula and must be determined by examining all the circumstances. The Court also held that the Administrator's interpretive bulletin was not binding, but was entitled to weight to the extent it had the power to persuade. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded for application of the proper standards.
The Court rejected a rigid rule that all waiting time is either compensable or noncompensable as a matter of law, emphasizing that the answer turns on the degree to which the employee's time is controlled by the employer and used predominantly for the employer's benefit. It explained that factual inquiries such as the agreements between the parties, the nature and extent of restrictions during on-call periods, and the practical construction of the working arrangement are critical. On the administrative-law point, the Court reasoned that interpretive guidance lacking force of law still reflects the specialized experience and informed judgment of the agency. Therefore, such guidance merits respect proportional to its persuasiveness rather than automatic deference.
Skidmore is foundational both in wage-and-hour law and administrative law. It established the enduring 'engaged to wait' versus 'waiting to be engaged' framework for compensable on-call time under the FLSA, and it created what is now called 'Skidmore deference' for informal agency interpretations. Its administrative-law approach remains central in cases such as Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). In the FLSA context, it connects closely with Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944), decided the same day and addressing compensability of waiting time.
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) |
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United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) |
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Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944) |
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