David Washington pleaded guilty in Florida to three capital murders, one attempted murder, and related crimes after a ten-day crime spree. He waived a jury for sentencing and admitted responsibility, while his lawyer chose not to seek out substantial character or psychological evidence and instead relied largely on Washington’s acceptance of responsibility. The trial judge sentenced Washington to death on each murder count after finding multiple aggravating circumstances and few mitigating factors. Washington later sought collateral relief, claiming his lawyer’s performance at sentencing was constitutionally ineffective.
What standard governs a criminal defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective under the Sixth Amendment that the conviction or death sentence must be reversed?
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Judicial review of attorney performance is highly deferential, and courts must avoid hindsight.
The Court held that ineffective-assistance claims are governed by a two-prong deficiency-and-prejudice test. Applying that standard, Washington failed to show that counsel’s sentencing performance was constitutionally ineffective or that any alleged errors created a reasonable probability of a different sentence.
The Court rejected standards that would judge counsel by rigid rules or presume prejudice too readily, emphasizing that the Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonably effective assistance, not perfect advocacy. Counsel’s strategic decisions are entitled to deference when made after reasonable investigation or a reasonable decision that further investigation is unnecessary. On the facts, the lawyer’s choice to focus on remorse and acceptance of responsibility rather than extensive mitigating evidence was not shown to be outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. The Court also concluded that, given the powerful aggravating evidence, Washington had not shown a reasonable probability that additional mitigating evidence would have changed the sentencing outcome.
Justice Marshall dissented, criticizing the majority’s highly deferential standard and arguing that the Court undervalued the role of thorough mitigation investigation in capital sentencing and made it too difficult for defendants to obtain relief.
Strickland is the foundational case for Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance doctrine and remains the controlling standard in both trial and sentencing contexts. It has shaped later decisions applying and refining counsel’s duties, including Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), and Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011). The case’s two-part test is central to postconviction litigation because it balances deference to attorney strategy with protection against serious lawyering failures.
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) |
Abstain |
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) |
Abstain |
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) |
Abstain |
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) |
Abstain |
Enter a case name or citation — get a structured brief where every case it cites is checked against real law.
Try Law Student Workbench →