A Cleveland police detective observed Terry and two other men repeatedly walk back and forth in front of a store, pausing to look inside and confer with one another. Suspecting that they were casing the store for a robbery, the officer approached them, identified himself, and asked for their names. Concerned for his safety, he spun Terry around and conducted a quick pat-down of the outside of Terry’s clothing, discovering a pistol in Terry’s overcoat pocket. Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and moved to suppress the gun as the product of an unlawful search and seizure.
Does the Fourth Amendment permit a police officer to stop a person on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and conduct a limited frisk for weapons on reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous?
Yes. A police officer may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes when the officer has specific and articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and may conduct a limited pat-down of outer clothing when the officer reasonably believes the person may be armed and presently dangerous.
The Court held that the officer’s stop and limited frisk of Terry were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and the revolver was properly admitted into evidence. The Fourth Amendment applies to such encounters, but probable cause is not required for this narrowly limited search and seizure.
The Court rejected the view that only full custodial arrests and traditional searches trigger the Fourth Amendment, holding that even a brief stop and pat-down are searches and seizures that must be reasonable. It balanced the government’s strong interest in crime prevention and officer safety against the limited intrusion of a brief investigatory stop and outer-clothing frisk. Because the officer could point to specific observations suggesting an imminent robbery and danger, the intrusion was justified at its inception and carefully limited in scope to discovering weapons. The search was not a general evidentiary search, but a protective measure aimed at ensuring the officer’s safety during the encounter.
Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that allowing stops and frisks on less than probable cause gave police greater authority than a magistrate can exercise and threatened Fourth Amendment protections.
Terry is the foundational stop-and-frisk case. It established the reasonable-suspicion standard for brief investigative detentions and protective frisks, creating what are commonly called "Terry stops." The decision shaped later Fourth Amendment doctrine in cases such as Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009).
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) |
Abstain |
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) |
Verified |
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) |
Abstain |
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) |
Abstain |
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) |
Abstain |
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