Tome was prosecuted in federal court for sexually abusing his young daughter on the Navajo Reservation. At trial, the defense theory was that the child accused Tome because she wanted to stay with her mother during an ongoing custody dispute. After the child testified, the Government introduced several out-of-court statements she made to a babysitter, her mother, a social worker, and physicians describing the abuse. Most of those statements were made after the alleged motive to fabricate had arisen, but the trial court admitted them under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), and Tome was convicted.
Does Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) permit admission of a witness's prior consistent statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive when those statements were made after the alleged motive to fabricate arose?
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement is admissible as nonhearsay to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only if the statement was made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive arose. The Rule incorporates the common-law premotive requirement.
No. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not admit prior consistent statements made after the alleged motive to fabricate or improper influence arose. Because the lower courts admitted the child's post-motive statements under that Rule, the judgment was reversed and remanded.
The Court read Rule 801(d)(1)(B) against the common-law backdrop, which long required that a consistent statement predate the alleged motive in order to rebut a claim of fabrication. The Rule's narrow wording focuses on rebutting charges of recent fabrication or improper motive, not on general bolstering of credibility, and post-motive statements do little to directly rebut the charge. The Advisory Committee Notes and the Rule's language tracked the traditional common-law formulation, indicating Congress meant to preserve the premotive limitation. Allowing all consistent statements regardless of timing would effectively turn the Rule into a broad credibility-bolstering provision, contrary to its text.
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, argued that the Rule's text does not contain a strict premotive requirement and that post-motive consistent statements can still be relevant to rebut charges of fabrication depending on the circumstances.
Tome is the leading case interpreting Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as imposing a strict premotive requirement for prior consistent statements offered to rebut charges of fabrication or improper motive. It limited the use of such statements as substantive evidence and rejected a broader balancing approach used by some lower courts. The case is closely tied to the later amendment and interpretation of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), including the expansion recognized in United States v. Finch, 79 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 1996), and it relies on older common-law authorities such as Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412 (1836).
United States v. Finch, 79 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 1996) |
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