The United States Customs Service issued tariff classification rulings to importers, including Mead Corporation, determining how imported goods would be classified under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. Mead imported day planners and challenged a Customs ruling that classified the goods in a way that imposed a tariff. Customs classification rulings were issued by local officials, applied to particular import transactions, and were not the product of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. The question became what level of judicial deference, if any, courts should give such agency interpretations.
When an agency interpretation is issued through relatively informal procedures lacking the force of law, is it entitled to Chevron deference or only the lesser respect described in Skidmore?
Chevron deference applies when Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. When those conditions are absent, an agency interpretation may still receive respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., depending on its persuasiveness.
Customs tariff classification rulings such as the one at issue were not entitled to Chevron deference because they were not made pursuant to congressional authorization to speak with the force of law in that form. They were eligible only for Skidmore respect to the extent they had the power to persuade.
The Court explained that Chevron is not triggered by every agency interpretation of a statute it administers. Instead, the key inquiry is whether Congress intended the agency to make binding law through the procedure used, which is often indicated by notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication, or some comparable lawmaking authority. Customs rulings were numerous, issued by many local offices, lacked precedential force within the agency in the way formal regulations do, and were not produced through procedures suggesting congressional intent to give them the force of law. Because the ruling lacked those features, the Court treated it under Skidmore rather than Chevron.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that Chevron should generally apply whenever an agency administers a statute and resolves an ambiguity in the course of doing so, without making the availability of deference turn so heavily on procedural formality.
Mead is a foundational administrative law case because it limited Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), by making deference depend on whether Congress delegated lawmaking authority and whether the agency acted pursuant to that authority. It also revived the importance of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), for informal agency interpretations. The case strongly influenced later deference decisions, including Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), and National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) |
Abstain |
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) |
Abstain |
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) |
Abstain |
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) |
Abstain |
National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) |
Abstain |
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