Two Black applicants to the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department challenged the department's use of "Test 21," a verbal-skills screening exam. They alleged the test disproportionately disqualified Black applicants and was not sufficiently related to job performance. The applicants sued under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, arguing that the test denied equal protection. The district court upheld the test, but the court of appeals reversed, relying on the racially disproportionate impact shown by the statistics.
Does a law or official practice that has a racially disproportionate impact violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment absent proof of a discriminatory purpose?
A facially neutral law or practice does not violate equal protection solely because it has a disproportionate racial impact. To establish a constitutional violation under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff generally must show that the challenged action was adopted or maintained because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects on an identifiable racial group.
No. Disproportionate racial impact alone does not make a facially neutral government practice unconstitutional; proof of discriminatory purpose is required, and the police department's use of Test 21 was therefore not invalid on the record presented.
The Court distinguished constitutional equal protection analysis from Title VII disparate-impact doctrine, emphasizing that the Constitution does not invalidate every official act producing racial disproportions. Statistical disparity may be relevant evidence, but it is not by itself sufficient to prove discriminatory intent. The record showed that Test 21 was used to measure verbal ability relevant to police training and communication duties, and there was no adequate showing that the test was designed or maintained to exclude Black applicants. Because the plaintiffs proved impact but not purposeful discrimination, the constitutional claim failed.
Washington v. Davis is a foundational equal protection decision because it established that discriminatory purpose, not just disparate impact, is ordinarily required for constitutional race-discrimination claims. It sharply limited efforts to constitutionalize the disparate-impact theory recognized in employment law under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The decision shaped later intent doctrine in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), which identified evidentiary factors for proving discriminatory purpose, and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), which clarified that the government must act because of adverse effects, not merely with awareness of them.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) |
Abstain |
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) |
Abstain |
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) |
Abstain |
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