Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the federal government set wheat acreage quotas to stabilize the national wheat market. Roscoe Filburn, an Ohio farmer, grew more wheat than his allotment allowed and was penalized. Filburn argued that the excess wheat was for home consumption on his farm, not for sale or commerce. He challenged the penalty on the ground that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate wheat never placed on the market.
May Congress, under the Commerce Clause, regulate wheat grown for personal consumption on a farm because of its aggregate effect on interstate commerce?
Congress may regulate even local, noncommercial activity if that activity, taken in the aggregate with similar conduct by others, exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. The reach of the Commerce Clause is not limited to transactions that are themselves interstate or sales in a formal market.
Yes. The Court held that Congress could regulate Filburn’s home-consumed wheat because, in the aggregate, such production would affect the national wheat market and thereby interstate commerce.
The Court reasoned that although Filburn’s own excess wheat was trivial in isolation and intended for personal use, homegrown wheat substitutes for wheat that would otherwise be bought in the market. If many farmers did the same, the cumulative effect would undermine Congress’s effort to control supply and stabilize prices in interstate commerce. Because the Agricultural Adjustment Act was part of a broader national scheme regulating the wheat market, Congress could reach even this local activity as necessary to make the scheme effective.
Wickard is a foundational modern Commerce Clause case and marks the high-water point of federal regulatory power over economic activity. Its aggregation principle strongly influenced later decisions, including Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). It also serves as a contrast point for limits recognized in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) |
Verified |
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) |
Abstain |
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) |
Abstain |
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) |
Abstain |
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) |
Abstain |
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